Technologies of the Self
"TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF:" FOUCAULT AND INTERNET DISCOURSE (1)
Alan Aycock
Department of Anthropology
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
_________________________________________________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
* Abstract
* Introduction
* Inner Substance
* Degree and Kind of Commitment
* Personal Routines or Disciplines
* Goal of Personal Transformation
* Conclusion: Implications for Research on Online Play
* Footnotes
* References
_________________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT
While some have argued that computing via the Internet offers a vision
of freedom and a shared humanity, others have claimed with equal
vehemence that it may become the instrument of global surveillance and
personal alienation. Foucault's notion of self-fashioning (souci de
soi) exemplifies both sides of this debate, since fashions may both be
imposed and freely chosen. To present a Foucauldian perspective on
fashioning of self online I use instances of recent postings to the
Usenet news group rec.games.chess. Key aspects of self-fashioning that
I identify include romantic and modernist images of interior
experience, the importance of keeping your "cool," the discussion of
techniques designed to improve skill or strength, and the purchase and
use of chess computers as icons of mastery. Finally, I consider some
implications of this Foucauldian approach for future research on
Internet self-constructions.
_________________________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
As the media breathlessly remind us several times a day, the Internet
is a global computing network that makes it possible for people to
talk to one another over great distances very cheaply and quickly.
Newsgroups, one of the services available on the Internet, are
electronic bulletin boards which allow subscribers to read and post
messages in thousands of specialized areas. There are very few
controls on postings to any newsgroup, which are as a result
frequently off topic, repetitive, vacuous, or offensive. Newsgroup
postings offer an opportunity for an anthropologist to do some
"lurking" without the usual costs of time, money, discomfort, or
political hassle associated with ordinary types of fieldwork. A
disadvantage of Internet ethnography of this sort is that it is much
harder to figure out what's going on when you can only observe what
people say, and not what they actually do. <2>
As part of my continuing research on play and modernity, I have
downloaded several weeks of postings <3> to the Internet newsgroup
rec.games.chess (henceforth "r.g.c") and studied them carefully; the
examples that I use here are drawn from these postings, changed only
to conceal individual identities. <4>/a>; To interpret these postings,
I have devised a model of the online fashioning of personal identity.
This model is based loosely upon Michel Foucault's notion of %soi de
souci%, the ethical care of self, roughly equivalent to the idea of
self-government which he addressed in his last writings (Foucault,
1990: p. 32; 1991b: p. 93). The title of this paper refers to
Foucault's notion of "technologies of the self" as devices --
mechanical or otherwise -- which make possible the social construction
of personal identity (Foucault 1988b). I take the Internet to
represent one such technology of the self.
The model has four components: (a) the private "inner substance" that
is believed to be the ultimate source of personal identity; (b) the
degree and kind of commitment that is made to a given activity; (c)
the personal routines or disciplines that are adopted to reshape one's
identity; (d) the eventual goal of the personal transformation that
has been undertaken. <5> I shall show how each of these four
components is aligned with a specific theme on r.g.c, and give
pertinent examples. I shall then discuss some implications of this
approach to understanding the fashioning of an Internet identity.
INNER SUBSTANCE
Inner substance may be discerned by the way people speak of
themselves. A nineteenth-century emphasis upon "romantic" imagery,
associated with mysterious inner passions and upwelling creativity,
has been supplemented in this century by "modernist" notions of
advancement through reason, study, and planning (Gergen, 1991, ch. 2).
The posters on r.g.c use both romantic and modern images, a blurring
of styles fairly common in everyday life as well, i.e., people often
speak of themselves as being deep and authentic, while nevertheless
receptive to personal improvements and achievements that reveal them
"as they really are." On the basis of a qualitative content analysis,
I have identified the inner substance of r.g.c with a romantic image
of "strength" or a modernist image of "skill." I'll give some examples
of this mixed romantic/modernist style of speaking from r.g.c
postings. In the first, the thread is "how to advance from
intermediate level:"
It's just a matter of gaining intuition as
to where your pieces belong so that they
work well together. Now that I've made some
progress in this area, I really
cringe when I see some B player put his
pieces on all the wrong squares and tie
himself in a knot.
Well, I am an inactive 1711 player and I
wish to interject the notion of "nerve" to
ratings improvement. I have seen some lower
rated players who just have no
nerve to play an agressive move or even a
move that looks good to them but
where they cannot see the obvious lines. . .
Perhaps nerve can be learned by
getting comfortable with different positions
but some seem to have more of it than others.
The posting above combines the language of personal "progress" with
the vocabulary of deep inward feelings or dispositions ("intuition,"
"nerve"). The second example deals with the issue of creativity or
"genius:"
What I want to investigate is the innovators
of the game. Those who played the game but
revolutionized the game due to their own
genius. . . Can anyone shed some light on these
geniuses and what makes them different from
the average player or even the average GM?
Here the romantic idea of "genius" and intrinsic "difference" or
uniqueness is juxtaposed to the modernist notion of progress
("revolutionized the game") and the "laws of logic and science." Yet
the "average GM" referred to is a white male of Euro-American
heritage: by implication, all are not equally capable of improvement.
<6>
DEGREE AND KIND OF COMMITMENT
An ideal commitment to chess adopts a demeanor which is neither too
distant nor too involved, a "cool" emotional style which requires the
routine expression of feelings in day to day public encounters, yet
also constrains such talk lest it cause embarrassment or public
disturbance (Stearns, 1994, p. 192). Posters to r.g.c use four devices
to shape their sense of commitment.
By far the most frequent such device, appearing in about
three-quarters of all postings on r.g.c according to my count of
subject-headers, is the posting of facts or techniques which display
shared interest in a topic. Here is a common example, which refers to
an opening sequence known as the Taimanov Benoni:
My experience with this line goes back to
1987 when ex-New Zealand player
David Flude played it against me in a
weekender in Melbourne. I responded with
18.Qf3,Qxf3 19.Nxf3,Rhe8 20.Kf2,c4?! (rather
than Shabalov's 20...Re4!) 21.Rd1
and eventually won. However I wasn't
convinced by my opening play, so took the
opportunity to ask David Norwood . . . He
offhandedly suggested 18.Qa4+,b5 (note
that this is why Black plays 14...Bxc3+, as
otherwise White could play Nxb5) 19.Qf4 ..
This sort of analysis has been greatly intensified by the outpouring
of chess literature since the 60's, the recent increase in the number
of international tournaments, and the proliferation of specialized
chess knowledge at every level of play. The emotional tenor of this
posting is what I would characterize as "impersonal, but friendly"
(cf. Stearns, 1994: ch. 7). There is much more that needs to be said
about the use of factual or technical postings on r.g.c, and I shall
return to this theme in the following section.
A second device that expresses an appropriate middle distance is the
"smiley" or "emoticon," which appear in 5-10% of all postings to
r.g.c. The smiley uses computer keystrokes to create an orthographic
picture that can be viewed only by cocking one's head to the left.
Another device to express emotionn places the word designating an
appropriate gesture or feeling in brackets. These are conventions
which add emotional nuance to abstract messages otherwise hard to
interpret. In this context, it serves to report the emotional standing
of the poster just as if s/he had said "cool," "great," "boring," or
another term of the current vocabulary of feeling. A couple of
examples will suffice:
Long time no talk.
You'll notice they haven't been developed
before castling kingside in BOTH games. ;-)
Emoticons and verbal representations of emotions are often used to
take the edge off confrontational postings, though some posters use
them routinely simply to enliven online talk.
A third device, apparent in approximately one-third of the postings to
r.g.c according to my subject-header count, is the "flame." Here is an
extreme example of an r.g.c flame:
Chess Clock: Mechanical
Yugoslavia made, working great. I am selling
this because I got a digital clock
and don't need it anymore. The only
problem is the glass of one of the clocks
is broken (just a little bit, not
entirely). $10 , firm + shipping. If you are
interested, please e-mail me.
(response)
You are stupid. If you are a girl I will
add this: You are a stupid bitch!!
The next flame is more typical, excerpted from a lengthy, vitriolic
debate that has continued for weeks on rgc concerning the financial
probity of the United States Chess Federation (USCF):
The Old Guard should say what's really on
their mind: We report news
that incommodes the powers-that-be and they
hate us for it.
It's certainly not obvious from these examples that flaming maintains
an appropriate personal distance, since there seems to be too much
involvement expressed. One way to interpret these flames would be to
argue that flaming defines the rule of emotional distance by
transgressing it, and certainly posters occasionally react to flames
by reproaching the flamer for her/his excess.
I have a strong impression, however, that the "flame" is also a kind
of ritualized confrontation that expresses formulaic anger much as
televised sports may express formulaic masculinity (Duncan, Messner,
and Aycock, 1994). I will not attempt to demonstrate in this paper
that "flames" are indeed formulaic, since that would be a major
research direction in itself, but I will point to the standardization
of verbal cues ("bitch," the "powers-that-be") which is characteristic
of other more familiar confrontations such as bar fights, exchanges
between motorists, letters to the editor, and abusive phone calls.
The fourth device to shape commitment to chess is the purchase, use,
and discussion online of commercial chess products and services (see
Jackson Lears, 1994: pp. 46ff., and Miller, 1994: pp. 76ff. on
romantic/modernist impulses in consumer culture). A formal methodology
would offer a more reliable figure for the frequency of
commodity-oriented postings on rgc, but my estimate of the content of
such postings is over 50%. Postings about commodities are similar to
factual postings because they demonstrate a shared interest in the
discussions of rgc. As a financial commitment, commodities exhibit
owners' personal involvement in online chess discourse. The good or
service purchased shows that the owner maintains an appropriate
distance, e.g., buying an book on the Taimanov Benoni, playing the
opening in tournament games, and chatting about it online is a
reasonable thing for a middle-class hobbyist to do. By contrast,
spending many thousands of dollars on books and equipment might not be
quite so reasonable, suggesting too great an involvement with the game
(cf. Aycock, 1988a and Aycock, 1995 on the use of commodities in chess
"over the board").
Here is a simple example, which suggests the importance of
commodification as a form of commitment to chess:
I'm trying to complete my set of British
Chess Magazine and would like to purchase three
volumes if anyone has them. They are 1881 (vol 1),
1882 (vol 2) and 1891 (vol 11).
It is implicit in this posting that the personal ownership of a chess
archive is in some sense equivalent to the mastery of chess knowledge
(Foucault, 1989: p. 45).
Personal Routines or Disciplines
Routines or disciplines on the Internet consist of the use of "words
without things," in which the words themselves become resources for
self- fashioning (Poster, 1990: p. 17; cf. Foucault, 1973: pp.
312ff.). Most of these words are offered online as "facts" or
"techniques." I mentioned above that two-thirds of rgc postings were
about "facts," but I haven't yet said what I think "facts" are. For
purposes of this paper, I define a "fact" as an utterance which
produces an effect of apparently simple referentiality, e.g., "the sun
rises in the east," or "this is a picture of my child." This
discursive effect of factual innocence usually reduces or eliminates
altogether the opportunity for further explanation. The social
stereotype of a bore or an ivory-towered intellectual would be someone
who attempts to interpret things which appear to be factually
transparent. It is intriguing that in a situation such as the Internet
where referentiality is more or less impossible to determine, the
majority of postings claim factual referentiality as their main source
of legitimacy; I'll return to this in my conclusion.
Factual talk is produced by a discursive purification which strips
statements of their particular personal, institutional, and historical
contexts, presenting them instead as universals. Information expressed
as objectively true may be used to sustain global claims of
rationality or common sense. When facts have been removed from an
easily recognizable context and formalized in some way, I refer to
them as "technique." <7> In addition to the legitimation lent by
factual talk, discussion of technique gives an impression of being "in
the know." <8> I'll give some examples of postings to illustrate how
this important impression is produced on rgc.
First, a request for information about the rules of play. This request
is especially significant because it pertains to "blitz," a variety of
chess that became popular in the 70's and 80's when chess clocks
became more accurate and players' demands for increased tempo of play
were formally registered by chess organizations (cf. Aycock, 1988b on
the role of chess organizations in instutionalizing play at all
levels).
I am curious about some freak cases that can
come about in blitz games
I have the USCF Rulebook (3rd edition, not
4th) which has FIDE 5-minute
chess rules in it, but these cases are not
clearly covered...
Second, here is some "techie talk" which is peculiar to the
computerization of chess in the last ten years, and to the development
of the Internet:
Hi. I have just discovered the Internet
Chess Server and would like to ask for
some advice. I run X-windows on a Sun
Sparc1, connect to an internet-connected
site via 14.4 kB modem, and telnet to the
ICS from there. I am currently observing
games using the ASCII graphics provided by ICS,
but I do have Xboard on my machine.
At one level of analysis, this posting is nothing but an invitation
for enthusiasts on rgc to exchange abstruse technical information. At
another, however, such exchanges construct a hierarchy of expertise
and personal legitimation. The final series of examples shows how
factual and technical talk becomes routinized through "political
arithmetic" (Foucault, 1988b: p. 151) on rgc:
(first example)
My 2 bits are that I have never liked the
BHB. I think the numbers are too small
and it is hard to tell how much time you
have left in sudden death.
(second example)
I am teaching 7- and 8- year olds to play
chess. What would be a good clock
setting for children at this age?
(third example)
Why doesn't someone just sit down with a
january issue of chess-life and the
current FIDE rating list and post the
difference in ratings for a dozen or so US
players? then we can get an accurate
picture, rather than debating about
this flat 150 pt rating discrepancy hogwash.
These examples are about the intensity of personal routines. Time
controls and statistical ratings define how players are to discipline
themselves for "serious" play, and how they are to be ranked against
one another (Hacking, 1990; Aycock, 1992a). Both are commodified,
since to be rated, one must pay tournament fees to participate in
timed play under the auspices of a formal chess organization. Time and
ratings are subject to long and passionate dispute on rgc and
elsewhere, leading to identification of calculable artifacts such as
"sudden death," "an accurate picture," "discrepancy," or "good clock
setting."
Goal of Personal Transformation
For most of those who post to rgc, the goal of personal transformation
is the formal mastery of chess.<9> Postings to the Internet differ
from other popular chess literature, however, in that there is far
more attention lent to the mastery of chess by computers. Speaking of
computer technology on rgc promotes notions of solidarity and
empowerment (Nye, 1994, pp. 172, 277).
An initial example of the goal of personal transformation, as I have
described it, is a posting about a computer program that plays chess.
Grandmaster Sagalchik returns to UMBC to
play one slow, rated game against a CM-5
Supercomputer running the MIT Star Socrates
chess program. . . .Kuszmaul (MIT) will
deliver a technical lecture on massively
parallel search and its application to computer
chess. . . Star Socrates is one of the best computer
chess programs in the world and plays at the
grandmaster level.
The notion of chess programs which play "at the grandmaster level" is
especially fascinating for rgc posters, who debate endlessly whether a
computer will ever be world champion, whether computers signal the
"death" of chess, and whether the published ratings of computers are
equivalent to those of human players. In this instance the chess
program has been constructed discursively as a competent agent, the
precise analog of human players (Aycock 1990).
A second example is one of human play mediated by Internet computer
linkages.
Some of you might like to play "live" chess
on the internet, and may not be aware
of the Internet Chess Server! . . . It's a
fun, club-like atmosphere, with people talking
about chess, kibitzing during games,
shouting greetings to each other, discussing
sports, arguing politics, etc.
The sense of community <10> is explicit here ("a fun, club-like
atmosphere," etc.), and it is interesting to note that by contrast
with the instance of the computer which plays chess "at a grandmaster
level," here the computer linkage has become effectively transparent,
a mere facilitator of the human agents who use it.
My model of the online fashioning of personal identity has helped me
to identify some interesting aspects of online discourses. In
particular, I have drawn attention to the significance of romantic and
modernist images of inner substance, the importance of maintaining a
middle distance or "cool" commitment to chess, the value of factual
and technical postings as personal routine or discipline designed to
improve skill or strength, and the intense rgc interest in chess
computers as icons of mastery.
Conclusion: Implications for Research on Online Play
One of the most common themes in popular computing literature is that
computers and the Internet are making us strong, smart, fast, and
free. <11> Yet this is what fills my screen every time I sign on to
the university mainframe that serves as my gateway to the Internet:
***********************************************
USE OF THIS SYSTEM BY UNAUTHORIZED
USERS IS PROHIBITED
***********************************************
INDIVIDUALS USING THIS COMPUTER SYSTEM
WITHOUT AUTHORITY, OR
IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY, ARE SUBJECT TO
HAVING ALL OF THEIR ACTIVITIES ON THIS SYSTEM
MONITORED AND RECORDED BY SYSTEM PERSONNEL.
In the process of monitoring individuals
improperly using this system, the activities
of authorized users *may* also be monitored.
Anyone using this system without
authorization or in excess of their
authorization expressly consents to such
monitoring and is advised that if such
monitoring reveals possible evidence of
criminal activity, system personnel may
provide the evidence of such monitoring
to law enforcement officials.
This panoptic regulation raises a variety of important issues such as
freedom, power, technique, and privacy, and links them closely in
Internet practice: in only four sentences, some variation of the word
"authority" is used six times, "monitor" or its variants are used
another six times, "use" appears five times, and the word "system" is
used seven times. The message is that authorities monitor users on
behalf of the system; authorities are aligned with law enforcement,
users with impropriety or criminal activity.
Perhaps this is an extreme example of Internet surveillance, but much
Internet discourse is at least covertly normative despite the overt
emphasis that Internet practitioners place upon its factual or
technical nature (e.g., "monitor" is both a physical object and a kind
of surveillance). By the same token, the Internet is largely a domain
of words without things, which nevertheless are represented by those
who post there as being utterly referential (e.g., a "system" is both
a hardware arrangement and an image of a self-governing organism). The
agents of discourse themselves are unequal irrespective of their
technical prowess (e.g., in computing jargon, authorities have
"privileges" that users do not). These contradictions permeate the
discourse of self fashioning on the Internet in general and, as I have
shown, on rgc in particular. What broad strategies of self fashioning
are available under these circumstances? I'll suggest three
possibilities, all of which tread the narrow line between constraint
and freedom.
One rgc poster, for instance, turns romantic images against modern
ones:
Computers are tools that we have created
to assist us improve in chess. The
fact that [computers offer] the illusion
of a well-played game of chess are irrelevent,
because there is no player. My
chessmaster 3000 can beat me all the time, but
I have not forsworn the game: the game is
fun. I use the computer as an opponent toD
improve my skill. But I play the game
against other human's for the fun and
competition of it. We just need to be
philosophically clear: computers are tools.
Humans are sentient creatures, worthy opponents.
And if some day we humans become
universally bored with chess because we have
exhausted the possibilities of it . . .
change the rules a little. It is our game, we
created it... Chess can still evolve if we grow
bored with it. But in the meantime, it is still fun
to play, fun to learn, and fun to compete. I can't
drive in a nail with my fist: does that mean I
should make my hammer out of nerf to
preserve my ego? I can't lift my car off the
ground: does that mean I should thrown
away my hydraulic jack? No body builder
will ever be able to lift as much weight
as a motorized winch. So why do they bother?
To improve themselves, and to compete
against humans.
As the Internet moves rapidly to a private enterprise model, the
limits and possibilities of self-fashioning proliferate. This poster
suggests that the self fashioning of play can be much more diverse
than "the illusion of a well- played game of chess" by a computer.
Here "worthy" "sentience" supplements strength or skill as the inner
substance to be worked upon, while fun as well as mastery is a goal of
play. Although the poster argues that personal disciplines should
include competition against other humans and the use of computers to
"improve," he has carefully referred to them as mere "tools" and
compared them to lesser, utilitarian objects such as the "hammer," the
"motorized winch," and the "hydraulic jack." Most interestingly, the
poster recommends that commitment to chess include not only buying the
tools of play, but also altering the rules of the game at will to
diminish the effects of those tools.
Another debate on rgc suggests a modernist, rather than a romantic
solution:
Let me compare the human limit to the
computer limit: ... The exponential complexity
of chess is such that increases in speed are
becoming incredibly ineffective at
furthering . . . depth... .So what are GM's
limits? All it takes to beat the best
computers is to follow strong strategic plans
that don't produce a win until 20-30+ moves down
the pike. . .
The strongest programs and the best humans
are playing two different games. The
strength of the strongest programs is in
killer tactics, and the strength of the
strongest humans is in killer strategy.. .
It's not obvious to me that the program will
have to play the human's game in order to
achieve dominance; but it obvious
that the human has to play the program's
game to retain dominance, since he has to
survive the near term in order to cash in on
the long term.
If it's "easy" to avoid deep tactical
blunders while building a long-range strategic
plan, the human GM can continue to win or
draw. If not, then not. It all depends
on the shape of the chess draw/win space.
If there is a broad flat plain of
draws/wins out there for the first player,
then it's a GM game. If it's a narrow
knife-edge of variations leading to co-
optimal play, then it's a program game, in the
limit.
I would find it an amazing coincidence if
world championship level chess were
forever almost but not quite within reach of
the best possible program on the best
possible hardware.
The "limits" of play are defined by the GM (always a "he") and by the
"best possible program on the best possible hardware," both presented
as social agents who in romantic images attempt to perfect their
"complexity" and "depth," and in modernist terms, must "plan" 20-30+
moves ahead, "cash in on the long term," use "killer" tactics and
strategy, "retain dominance," and avoid "blunders." The poster uses
mathematical analogs drawn from geometry and game theory to display a
"cool" distance toward the fate of the game and those who play it: the
"shape of chess space" is studied by ideal social agents,
super-computer and super-GM, who search for "co-optimal play." The
conclusion is that unless there is "an amazing coincidence" computers
will achieve "world championship level chess," the triumph of the
modern (Adas, 1989; Segal, 1985, 1994).
Finally, Foucault himself offered, in quite another context, a
problematique of the Internet that might be neither romantic nor
modernist. I'll cite it without comment:
So many things, in their language, have
already escaped them; they do not mean to lose,
in addition, what they say, that little
fragment of discourse . . . whose frail and
uncertain existence is necessary to prolong their
life in time and space. . .
In each sentence that you
pronounce -- and very precisely in the one
that you are busy writing at this moment, you who
have been so intent, for so many pages, on
answering a question in which you felt
yourself personally concerned and who are going
to sign this text with your name -- in every
sentence there reigns the nameless
law, the blank indifference: 'What matter
who is speaking; someone has said:
what matter who is speaking' (Foucault,
1991a, pp. 71-72).
_________________________________________________________________
Footnotes
1. A substantially different version of this paper was originally
presented on February 22, 1995, during my tenure as Visiting
Fellow at the Center for Twentieth Century Studies at the
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. I would like to thank Kathy
Woodward for inviting me to join the Center during the 1994-95
year. I would also like to thank Carol Tennessen, Cathy Egan, and
Nigel Rothfels for their continuing administrative and collegial
support during the year. Paul Brodwin made some valuable
suggestions that led me to reconsider the conclusion of my paper,
as did the reviewers for the _Journal of Computer-Mediated
Communication_. I especially thank Margaret Carlisle Duncan for
her critical reading of several versions of this essay.
2. Cf. Aycock, 1989, 1992b on issues arising from discursive
approaches to the ethnography of play; see also Aycock, 1993a,
1993b, and Aycock and Buchignani, 1995, on Internet ethnography.
3. In all, I downloaded about a megabyte of information.
4. I have not corrected spelling, grammar, or typos, as the examples
themselves make evident.
5. The corresponding Foucauldian categories are (a) the
identification of an individual's ethical component, or substance,
which s/he must develop; (b) a mode of subjection which
establishes an individual's relationship to the ethical rule or
discipline in question; (c) an ethical labor that transforms the
individual's substance; and (d) a goal of self-care (Foucault,
1990, pp. 26-28).
6. A perennial favorite of rgc posters is gender disproportion in
chess, where male masters outnumber females manyfold. This is
often attributed to "natural" causes, i.e., different brain
structures. It's interesting that although the white-black
disproportion is far greater, there is no comparable debate about
that, because it is taken as given that blacks'social
disadvantages prevent them from participating fully.
7. I'll not deal here with the difficult question of how "facts" and
"techniques" are linked as practices.
8. The term "pure technique" that is so often used in ordinary
parlance on rgc or elsewhere seems exactly right, since it
suggests both the exalted, refined essence of those who share this
understanding, and as well the process of definition that is
associated with purification (Douglas, 1992; Zerubavel, 1991;
Lamont and Fournier, 1992).
9. For those very few who have already become masters, achievement of
an international title is the next step.
10. Though not necessarily a substance shared by everyone, since
solidary talk about "sports" and "politics" seem to focus on
stereotypically male interests.
11. For instance, Nelson, 1987; Naisbitt, 1990, 1994; Tapscott and
Caston, 1993; Kehoe, 1994; and Toffler, 1990.
_________________________________________________________________
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